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Abstract
The ‘right to be forgotten’ (RTBF) is an emerging
concept that refers to an individual’s ability to have
data collected about themselves permanently deleted
or “destroyed”—the final stage of the information
life cycle. However, we do not yet understand where
RTBF fits into existing theory and models of privacy
concerns. This is due, at least in part, to the lack of
validated instruments to assess RTBF. Therefore,
following the methodology detailed by MacKenzie et
al. [1], this paper develops scales to measure
individuals’ concerns about the RTBF. We validate
the scale and show that the RTBF represents a
separate dimension of privacy concerns that is not
reflected in existing privacy concerns instruments.

1. Introduction
The explosive growth of ‘Big Data’ and the
‘Internet of Things’ means that ever more data about
individuals is being collected, aggregated, and
analyzed. Therefore it is not surprising that
consumers have expressed an interest in being able to
delete some of that information [2, 3]. For example, a
recent national survey found that 88% of Americans
supported a federal law mandating a right to delete
their personal information that was collected and
stored by organizations [2]. A similar poll in the EU
reported that 75% of respondents wanted the ability
to delete personal information [3]. In response, in
2014 the European Union Court of Justice ruled that
Google had to provide some form of a RTBF to
European consumers [4]. In the USA, California
passed a law (SB 568) that provides a limited form of
a RTBF to minors [5].
This desire for a RTBF is especially relevant for
social networking sites, as evidence grows about the
potential harm (e.g., loss of employment or education
opportunities) resulting from information individuals
posted about themselves [6, 7]. In response to this
growing interest, Facebook allows users to delete
their own profiles and search history [8]. Indeed,
there is evidence that people are increasingly
attempting to take control of their personal
information that is posted on social networking sites
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[9], but are hampered in doing so because manual
procedures are error-prone and tools are difficult to
use [10]. Consequently, businesses have emerged
(e.g., reputation.com) to perform such services.
However, attempting to monitor and defend one’s
online reputation is a reactive strategy that does not
eliminate the potentially harmful information. Hence,
consumer interest in a RTBF that would provide a
more proactive strategy for managing one’s online
reputation. Indeed, the proximate impetus for
establishing a RTBF in the EU stems from the desires
of a Spanish citizen to restrict access to outdated
information about the person’s financial history [4].
The EU court acceded to those concerns by requiring
Google to block that information from appearing in
response to searches executed against the individual.
However, because the information can still be
accessed from the websites of the news organizations
that originally published the stories, the court’s ruling
essentially provides for a right to be “de-indexed” (so
that it does not appear in Google search results)
rather than a pure right to delete information [11].
Although there has been much debate about the
RTBF [6, 11-19], those discussions focus on
questions of cost, feasibility, and likely impact on
freedom of expression and the future development of
the Internet. Scant attention has been paid to the
relationship of the RTBF to consumers’ privacy
concerns. This is an important gap, given that the
RTBF is intended to increase individuals’ ability to
protect their personal data.
Interestingly, existing instruments designed to
measure privacy concerns [20-23] do not explicitly
address the topic of data deletion. One explanation
for this may be that these instruments were developed
prior to the phenomenon of ‘Big Data’, when
companies were still concerned about the cost of
storage. Nevertheless, it is possible that the concerns
that gave rise to the call for a RTBF are implicitly
reflected in one or more of the existing scales. For
example, the desire to be able to delete outdated
information that is no longer relevant may be an
aspect of wanting to control how one’s personal
information is used or part of concerns about being
able to correct errors in that data. Both control and
errors are aspects of the existing privacy concerns
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scale [22, 24]. However, it is also possible that
attitudes about the RTBF are not represented in
existing measures of privacy concerns.
The question of whether the RTBF is already
addressed in existing privacy concerns instruments or
is a heretofore-neglected dimension of privacy is
important because privacy concerns affect consumer
intentions and behaviors [25-27]. Moreover, firms
can choose to adopt a number of different attitudes
toward the protection of consumer privacy [28] and
can use privacy as a strategic competitive weapon
that may enable them to charge higher prices [29].
Thus, if existing instruments omit an important
dimension of privacy concerns, research results may
be misleading and firms may make erroneous
decisions. Consequently, our research questions are:
How should RTBF be measured? and How does the
RTBF relate to previously identified dimensions of
privacy concerns?
To answer that question we follow MacKenzie et
al.’s [1] prescriptions for construct development and
develop and validate a scale to measure consumer
attitudes about the RTBF. We then empirically test
the relationship between RTBF and previously
validated dimensions of privacy concerns.

2. Literature Review
Belanger and Crossler [30] and Smith et al. [31]
reviewed and analyzed more than two decades of
research on privacy. They note that one topic that has
received considerable attention is the development of
instruments to measure privacy concerns. However,
although much progress has been made, an editorial
that accompanied those two reviews identified the
need to more precisely specify the nature of the
construct privacy concerns [32, p. 984].
Subsequently, Hong and Thong [24] examined
the questions used in prior research on privacy and
validated a model in which individuals’ privacy
concerns consist of the following six dimensions:
1. Awareness that personal data is being collected
and how it will be used
2. Collection of personal data
3. Control over the use of personal data
4. Secondary use and sharing of personal data with
other entities
5. Protection of personal data from improper access
6. Errors in personal data and the ability to correct
them
Collectively, the six dimensions address issues
related to the acquisition, use, and storage of
individuals’ personal information, but say nothing
about its disposal. This is surprising because the

concept of the right to delete one’s personal
information has been discussed in legal journals [33],
popular books [34], and privacy frameworks [35].
For example, Generally Accepted Privacy Principles
[35] Principle 5 is titled “Use, Retention, and
Disposal of Information” and recommends that
“personal information is retained for no longer than
necessary to fulfill the stated purposes [for which it
was originally collected]” (section 5.2.2) and that
“personal information no longer retained is
anonymized, disposed of, or destroyed in a manner
that prevents loss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized
access” (section 5.2.3). Privacy advocates similarly
stress the need for “end-to-end” protection of privacy
throughout the entire information life cycle and the
use of secure procedures to destroy personal
information once it is no longer needed [36, 37].
Clearly, consumers are interested in some form of
RTBF as a means to augment their ability to protect
their personal data. Therefore, the question is whether
those interests are reflected in the existing scales used
to measure privacy concerns, or need to be added to
those instruments. As previously mentioned, none of
the six primary dimensions of privacy concerns
explicitly mention deletion of data. Nevertheless, it is
possible that one or more of the existing dimensions
subsumes that issue.
The first two dimensions, awareness and
collection, focus on the initial acquisition of personal
information and, therefore, clearly do not address the
issue of a RTBF. However, dimension three, control
over how collected data is used, could possibly be
interpreted as encompassing not just the processing
of that data, but also its retention and disposal.
Indeed, as previously noted, Generally Accepted
Privacy Principle 5 addresses “use, retention, and
disposal” of information. Nevertheless, examination
of the specific questions used to measure control
suggests otherwise. Two questions ask if it “usually
bothers” the respondent when they “do not have
control of personal information that I provide” and
when they “do not have control or autonomy over
decisions about how my personal information is
collected, used, and shared”, and the third question
asks if the respondent is “concerned when control is
lost or unwillingly reduced as a result of a marketing
transaction” [24, p. 298]. Thus, it does not seem that
any of the questions used to measure the “control”
dimension of privacy concerns explicitly refer to the
topic of the RTBF.
The fourth privacy concern dimension is
secondary use. At first glance, this appears to at least
partially address the issue of a RTBF, especially
given that the case that triggered the EU’s decision to
create a RTBF revolved around the fact that outdated
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and, therefore, arguably irrelevant information about
past financial conditions continued to appear in
Google search results. However, the three questions
used to measure concern about “secondary use”
discuss concern about websites to which personal
information is given using that information for
unanticipated reasons, or selling it or sharing it with
other entities [24, p. 297]. The EU case involving the
Spanish citizen, however, dealt with information that
was originally reported by news organizations, which
then subsequently was indexed by Google not
information provided by the data subject. Thus, it is
not clear whether the existing questions about
“secondary use” do address the RTBF.
Dimension five deals with concerns about
improper access to stored personal information.
Given the seemingly never-ending revelations about
breaches that create the risk of identity theft, such
concerns could indeed be a motivation for wanting to
be able to delete information that entities store about
oneself. However, although concern about protecting
stored information may contribute to a desire for a
RTBF in order to protect that data, it is not clear that
the two constructs are identical.
Dimension six deals with concerns about errors in
the data. The questions used to assess this dimension
ask if the respondent is concerned that websites “do
not take enough steps to make sure that my personal
information in their files is accurate,” “do not have
adequate procedures to correct errors in my personal
information,” and “do not devote enough time and
effort to verifying the accuracy of my personal
information in their databases” [24, p. 298]. Those
questions certainly are related to the concerns in the
EU case that outdated and, therefore, irrelevant
information about past financial history was returned
in Google searches. However, as with concerns about
secondary use and improper access, although
concerns about errors may contribute to the demand
for a RTBF, it is not clear that they are identical
concepts.
Thus, it is not clear whether the six dimensions in
existing instruments designed to measure privacy
concerns address the issue of the RTBF. Therefore,
we developed a scale designed to specifically address
the RTBF and then empirically tested whether those
questions load on one or more of the existing six
dimensions of privacy concerns or represent a
heretofore-overlooked dimension of privacy.

3. Methodology
We followed the methodology outlined by
MacKenzie et al. [1] to develop a valid instrument

(see Figure 1). In the results section we report the
results for completing the first five phases (Steps 1-9
in Figure 1) of that process. In total, we conducted 4
separate data collections that were administered to
various combinations of business school students and
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Each subsection
describes specific measures and populations for that
phase of the project.

Figure 1. Instrument Development Process [1, p. 297]

4. Results
4.1. Conceptualization
Figure 1 shows that the first step in developing a
new instrument entails developing a conceptual
definition of the construct. We began by reviewing
the discussions about the RTBF in the popular press
and the academic literature. Based on our review of
that literature we posit the following definition:
The RTBF applies to individuals. It is a
feeling that reflects the desire to be able to
delete personal information stored by other
entities and accessible from the Internet.
We suggest that the RTBF applies both to
information that was directly provided by the
individual [9, 17, 33, 34] and to information about an
individual that was originally generated by others [4].
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Prior research on privacy concerns has shown that
those concerns vary in intensity depending upon the
nature of the specific information in question (e.g.,
personal behaviors, beliefs, financial, health, etc.)
[30, 31]. Discussions of the RTBF suggest that it, too,
would vary depending upon the nature of the
information in question. For example, the EU court
case that requires Google to comply with the RTBF
specifically involves financial information that is
dated and, therefore, arguably irrelevant [4].
Similarly, discussions about the desire to delete
social media posts focus on potentially embarrassing
behaviors and statements of opinion [6, 9].
MacKenzie et al. [1, p. 302] note that constructs
are not inherently formative or reflective, but that the
way in which they are treated depends upon how the
researcher conceptualizes the construct. The six
previously validated dimensions of privacy concerns
have been conceptualized as unidimensional
constructs and, therefore, measured with a set of
reflective indicators [24]. As noted earlier, those six
dimensions address the acquisition, use and storage
of personal information. The RTBF addresses
concerns about the final stage of the information life
cycle: disposal. Therefore, for purposes of testing
whether the RTBF is already captured in the existing
dimensions of privacy concerns, we treat it as a
unidimensional construct and propose to measure it
with a set of reflective indicators.

4.2. Development of Measures
Steps 2 and 3 entail creating items to measure the
construct and assessing their content validity.
Because the RTBF has not been previously
measured, we created six initial items while drawing
from the most recently validated instrument [24] for
all other privacy concern items: awareness (AWA),
controls (CON), secondary use (SEC), errors (ERR),
accuracy (ACC), and collection (COL).
4.2.1 Content Adequacy Test
We then followed MacKenzie et al.’s [1, p. 304]
recommended content adequacy test for assessing the
content validity of the items by creating a matrix in
which the columns represented different constructs
and the rows represented items.
In our case, the matrix had seven columns, one
for each of the previously validated dimensions of
privacy concerns and one for the RTBF construct.
The top row in each of those columns contained a
definition of the construct. An eighth column,
unlabeled, at the far left of the matrix contained
individual question items in each row. The rows in

the matrix contained the new items we created to
measure the RTBF and the prior-validated items for
the other six dimensions of privacy concerns.
We asked participants to rate, on a scale of 1-5,
how well each item fit each dimension. Next, we ran
a repeated measures analysis of variance (rANOVA)
to analyze each individual survey item to see if it
rates significantly highest on its own sub-construct by
examining a contrast comparison between the
intended sub-construct and all others. If the
difference is statistically significant, then the content
is valid and the item is more likely to demonstrated
discriminant validity [38].
Two content adequacy tests were performed on
our six new items as well as the existing 18 items
from the most recently validated privacy concerns
scale [24]. To our knowledge, this is the first time
that the privacy concerns scale has been analyzed
using the content adequacy test. Because of the high
cognitive load of rating each item across each subconstruct (7 x 24 = 168 questions), we made three
versions of the survey that each included a random
selection of 8 of the 24 items to rate across the subconstructs. The survey also included the actual
privacy concerns instrument after the content
adequacy test for a total of 80 items plus
demographic questions. The results were then
combined into a single data set. The results of the
first data collection included 800 responses from
university students in the business college of a large
public university in the western United States.
However, 231 responses were removed for being
incomplete, incorrectly answering trap questions,
straight-lining, or taking very little time to complete
the entire survey, resulting in 569 usable responses.
4.2.2. Content Adequacy Test Results
Table 1 summarizes the results, which were
mostly positive with some exceptions. The gray
shaded cells indicate an item loading significantly
higher on its own intended construct than all others.
The black cells with white text indicate problems
with an item. First, RTBF3 did not load significantly
higher on the RTBF construct than on CON.
Therefore, it was removed from subsequent data
collections. However, the five remaining items were
valid. Interestingly, one of the existing scale items for
the sub-construct AWA and another for COL did not
pass the content adequacy test even though they were
copied directly from past research [22, 24]. AWA3
did load highest on its own factor, but that loading
was not significant in the rANOVA. COL3 did not
even load highest on its own sub-construct.
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RTBF1
RTBF2
RTBF3
RTBF4
RTBF5
RTBF6
ACC1
ACC2
ACC3
AWA1
AWA2
AWA3
COL1
COL2
COL3
CON1
CON2
CON3
ERR1
ERR2
ERR3
SEC1
SEC2
SEC3

Table 1. Results of First Content Adequacy Test
RTBF ACC AWA COL CON ERR
SEC
3.97 3.11
3.24 3.17 3.77 2.78 2.89
3.98 3.03
3.33 3.16 3.78 2.81 2.94
3.89 2.91
3.36 3.05 3.83 2.70 2.89
3.94 3.04
3.28 3.08 3.68 2.76 2.88
4.15 2.98
3.50 3.18 3.66 2.86 2.93
4.07 2.95
3.56 3.14 3.76 2.87 2.82
3.01 3.98
3.30 3.01 3.29 2.68 3.32
3.05 4.04
3.32 2.92 3.23 2.49 3.14
3.14 3.99
3.60 3.22 3.46 2.76 3.51
3.16 3.29
3.76 3.15 3.38 2.81 3.24
3.02 3.34
4.03 3.23 3.63 2.68 3.52
3.04 3.36
3.67 3.63 3.64 2.80 3.23
3.13 3.29
3.34 3.90 3.36 2.61 3.08
2.96 2.87
3.16 3.63 3.25 2.44 3.02
3.32 3.20
3.70 3.63 3.54 2.84 3.22
3.38 3.24
3.54 3.40 4.11 2.83 3.20
3.23 3.31
3.60 3.57 4.10 2.68 3.60
3.07 3.35
3.50 3.16 3.82 2.88 3.24
2.94 3.28
3.07 3.35 2.80 3.82 2.77
2.75 3.14
2.91 3.22 2.77 3.87 2.64
2.76 3.29
3.18 3.27 2.81 3.85 2.72
3.49 3.37
3.45 2.67 3.54 3.17 3.94
3.42 3.21
3.39 2.50 3.42 3.08 3.97
3.59 3.34
3.61 2.70 3.80 3.24 3.93

Therefore, to further contribute to the body of
research on the privacy ,s instrument, we made slight
modifications to those existing scales (the entire scale
is found later) and executed another content adequacy
test. In the second round of testing, we collected 269
responses (238 usable) from Amazon Mechanical
Turk and only included AWA3, COL3, and 6 other
randomly selected items to keep the survey length
comparable to the prior data collection. The
ANOVAs revealed that our changes to AWA3 and
COL3 improved them enough to rate significantly
highest on their own intended sub-constructs (p <
0.001). Therefore, we conclude that our scale
(including the five remaining RTBF items created for
this study) has sufficient content validity.

4.3. Model Specification
Step 4 in the instrument creation process involves
specifying the formal measurement model. In the
most recent privacy concerns instrument validation,
Hong and Thong [24] found evidence of a third order
privacy concern factor with two second-order factors
among the 6 prior sub-constructs. Figure 1 visualizes
the model specification they selected after testing 12
alternatives.

COL1
COL2

COL

COL3
SEC1
SEC2

SEC

Interaction
management

SEC3
CON1
CON2

CON

CON3

Privacy
concerns

AWA1
AWA2

AWA

AWA3
ERR1
ERR2

ERR
Information
management

ERR3
ACC1
ACC2

ACC

ACC3

Figure 1. Privacy Concern Model [24]

An important aspect of this research is to discover
where RTBF fits within this existing privacy concern
model. Therefore, after the RTBF scale is validated,
we will examine whether it fits best as: 1) a reflection
directly from the third order privacy concern factor,
2) a reflection of the second order interaction
management factor, 3) a reflection of the second
order information management factor, or 4) an
entirely separate factor from privacy concern.

4.4. Scale Evaluation and Refinement
Steps 5 and 6 of the instrument creation process
entail collecting data to pretest the instrument and
then using those results to purify and refine the
instrument, respectively.
Before the two content adequacy tests described
previously, we executed a pilot test which led to
several important changes even before the content
adequacy tests began. In addition, the entire privacy
concerns scale was measured during each content
adequacy test for a total of three unique pilot tests.
With each pilot test, we performed a covariancebased structural equation modeling tool. Table 2
summarizes the samples and CFA results of each
pilot test. The results indicate adequate fit [1, 39].
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Table 2. CFA results for each pilot tests
Pilot 1
Pilot 2
Pilot 3
n
224
569
238
Source
AMT
students
AMT
CMIN/df
2.082
1.918
2.002
NFI
.860
.924
.875
CFI
.964
.962
.933
PRatio
.826
.757
.826
RMSEA
.070
.042
.071

The following statistics were calculated solely
for the last pilot test. Reliability for each scale was
analyzed by measuring Cronbach’s alpha for each of
the sub-dimensions and was well-above the 0.7
threshold, ranging from 0.87 to 0.93.
To evaluate the reliability of each individual
scale item, we examined the significance of the
estimate (λ) of the relationship between an indicator
and the latent construct. All items were significant.
Convergent validity was analyzed by calculating
the average variance extracted (AVE) for each firstorder reflective sub-construct. All AVEs were wellover the 0.50 recommended cutoff [40], ranging from
0.76 to 0.86. The second order privacy s construct
was also above the cutoff at 0.78. Convergent
validity for this data was sufficient.
Discriminant validity was analyzed by
examining whether the average variance explained
(AVE) by the indicators for their underlying latent
constructs is greater than the squared correlation
between the focal construct and the other subconstructs [40]. The results indicated sufficient
discriminant validity as all AVEs for each subconstruct were greater than their squared correlations
with other sub-constructs.
In summary, we conclude that the pilot data—
after accounting for the changes made during the
content adequacy tests—exhibits sufficient reliability
to proceed with final data collection.

4.5. Validation
Validation of the refined scale (steps 7 through 9
in the instrument creation process) includes the
collection of new data, validation of the scale with
the new data, and cross-validation from different
populations [1].
The final data collection was based on a combined
sample of 331 AMT workers and 78 students. As
with the pilot data collections, responses sets were
removed if participants: 1) straight-lined responses,
2) missed any of the four trap questions, or 3) spent
less than 1/3 of the median time taking the survey. As
usual, all latent construct items were completely
randomized across all constructs and sub-constructs.

This resulted in a total of 324 completed response
sets. Demographic questions concerning age, current
residence, ethnicity, and education were included at
the end of the survey.
Because no changes were made to the scales after
the third pilot test, the data were combined for a total
of 552 response sets. The participants were 57
percent male and an average of 35 years old. Six
percent were drawn from people currently living
outside of the US. 77 percent of respondents were
Caucasian, 6 percent African American, 3 percent
Hispanic, and 11 percent Asian. On average,
participants had earned at least a 2-year degree.
4.5.1. Final Measurement Model
The scale validity statistics were slightly
improved over the pilot tests. The CFA produced the
following results: CMIN/df = 2.733, NFI = 0.951,
CFI = 0.968, PRatio = 0.826, and RMSEA = 0.056.
Reliability for each sub-construct was high with
Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.84 to 0.92. All scale
item estimates (λ) were significant. All AVEs
exceeded 0.50 [40], ranging from 0.75 to 0.84. Also,
all AVEs exceeded the squared correlation of each
sub-construct with every other sub-construct. In
summary, the final data set indicated strong
reliability and validity. Table 3 lists the final
measurement scale including both the RTBF items. It
should also be noted that the items AWA3 and
COL3, while drawn from prior research [24], were
updated in this study based on the results of the
content adequacy tests (see Table 1).
Table 3. Final Privacy Concerns Scale Including RTBF
ACC1: I am concerned that company or government agencies
do not protect my personal information from unauthorized
access.
ACC2: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not devote enough time and effort to preventing
unauthorized access to my personal information.
ACC3: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not take enough steps to make sure that
unauthorized people cannot access my personal information
in their computers.
AWA1: I am concerned when a clear and conspicuous
disclosure is not included in the privacy policies of companies
or government agencies.
AWA2: It usually bothers me when I am not aware or
knowledgeable about how my personal information will be
used by companies or government agencies.
AWA3: It usually bothers me when companies or government
agencies do not tell me the way the data are collected,
processed, and used.
COL1: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies are collecting too much personal information about
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me.
COL2: It usually bothers me when companies or government
agencies ask me for personal information.
COL3: When companies or government agencies try to
collect my personal information, I sometimes hesitate to
provide it.
CON1: It usually bothers me when I do not have control of
personal information that I provide to companies or
government agencies.
CON2: It usually bothers me when I do not have control or
autonomy over decisions about how my personal
information is collected, used, and shared by companies or
government agencies.
CON3: I am concerned when control is lost or unwillingly
reduced as a result of a marketing transaction with
companies or government agencies.
ERR1: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not take enough steps to make sure that my
personal information in their files is accurate.
ERR2: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not have adequate procedures to correct errors
in my personal information.
ERR3: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not devote enough time and effort to verifying
the accuracy of my personal information in their databases.
RTBF1: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies do not allow me to delete information I've given
them.
RTBF2: It usually bothers me that companies or government
agencies don't offer a process for me to request deletion of
information I've given them.
RTBF4*: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies may not honor my requests to delete information
I've given them.
RTBF5*: It usually bothers me that companies or government
agencies do not give me the option to have my information
deleted.
RTBF6*: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies may not be capable of deleting my information
when I request that they do so.
SEC1: I am concerned that when I give personal information
to a company of government agency, the entity would use
the information for other reasons.
SEC2: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies would sell my personal information to other
companies.
SEC3: I am concerned that companies or government
agencies would share my personal information with other
entities without my consent.
Note: *RTBF3 was removed based on the content
adequacy test. All remaining RTBF items are valid.
However, to reduce survey fatigue, we recommend
retaining RTBF4, RTBF5, and RTBF6 which exhibited the
best discriminant validity. Bolded terms (AWA3 and COL3)
represent modified versions of previously validated
questions that improved the performance of the content
adequacy test.

4.5.2. Determining Model Specification
After confirming the measurement scale validity
and reliability statistics for the new RTBF scale
(along with the other six privacy concern subconstructs), we next seek to determine the most
appropriate model specification. In particular, we
next examine model fit statistics with four alternative
models (depicted in Figure 2) of how the RTBF could
relate to the previously validated structure of privacy
concerns [24].
Privacy
concerns

Model A

Interaction
management

COL

SEC

Information
management

CON

AWA

ERR

Interaction
management

SEC

Information
management

CON

AWA

ERR

ACC

RTBF

Privacy
concerns

Model C

Interaction
management

RTBF

COL

SEC

Information
management

CON

AWA

Interaction
management

SEC

ERR

ACC

Privacy
concerns

Model D

COL

RTBF

Privacy
concerns

Model B

COL

ACC

Information
management

CON

AWA

RTBF

ERR

ACC

Figure 2. Alternative Model Specifications

Model 1 treats the RTBF as entirely separate
from privacy concerns. Model 2 includes RTBF as a
sub-construct of the second order factor interaction
management. Model 3 includes RTBF as a subconstruct of the second order factor interaction
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management. Model 4 includes RTBF as a reflection
directly from the third order privacy concerns factor.
Table 4 summarizes the model fit statistics for each
version of the models in Figure 2.
Table 4. Fit Statistics across Models
1
2
CMIN/df
2.882 2.932
NFI
0.958 0.945
CFI
0.972 0.963
PRATIO
0.743 0.801
RMSEA
0.058 0.059

3
2.909
0.945
0.963
0.801
0.058

4
2.914
0.945
0.963
0.801
0.058

Based on the fit statistics in Table 4, each model
of privacy concerns demonstrates good fit. Therefore,
it appears that the RTBF is indeed related to the other
six dimensions of privacy concerns, but the exact
nature of that relationship needs further investigation.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
Prior research on privacy has established that
people are concerned about being adequately aware
of the information being collected about themselves,
the amount and nature of the information that is
collected, the degree to which they can control what
organizations do with their information, secondary
use and sharing of that information, the ability to
correct errors in information stored about them, and
the security of that information. This study
investigated whether those six dimensions of privacy
concerns also subsume the recent interest in the
ability to delete personal information, referred to as
the RTBF, or if the RTBF is a separate construct.
We
followed
recommended
procedures
MacKenzie et al. [1] to develop and validate a set of
five questions to assess an individual’s feelings about
the RTBF. We then included those five questions
along with previously validated questions about the
six existing dimensions of privacy concerns and
administered the instrument to both AMT workers
and students. Our results show that the RTBF is a
separate construct that is distinct from the existing six
dimensions of privacy concerns.
Thus, our results indicate that existing measures
of privacy concerns do not incorporate people’s
concerns about the RTBF. Therefore, research about
the antecedents and outcomes of privacy concerns
may not necessarily apply to the RTBF.
Consequently, organizations should not assume that
their existing privacy strategy [e.g., 41] adequately
addresses consumers’ feelings about the RTBF. A
reasonable explanation for our findings regarding
RTBF is that the phenomenon of interest is emergent
and not fully calibrated into the experiences of

everyday life. Similarly, it was not long ago that
being in possession of a social media profile was a
non-topic to begin with.
Nevertheless, the RTBF is highly correlated with
existing dimensions of privacy concerns. One likely
explanation is that all seven constructs deal with an
individual’s personal information that is stored with
various organizations. However, the RTBF appears to
be distinct from the six dimensions of privacy
concerns identified by prior research. This may
reflect a critical difference in the temporal relevance
associated with those seven constructs. Some of the
other six dimensions of privacy concerns represent
factors that have immediate bearing on decisions
about whether to disclose or share information: To
what extent do I feel adequately aware that
information about me is being collected (AWA)?
How comfortable am I in disclosing specific types of
information (COL)? How secure will that
information be (ACC)? Other questions have
delayed, but still relatively short-term relevance:
How might my information be subsequently shared
(SEC)? Will I be able to correct errors (ERR)? How
much control will I be able to exert over what the
organization does with my information (CON)?
In contrast, the RTBF is likely to become
relevant only at some time in the future, when
someone is contemplating changes in behavior or
status. This is important because psychology research
shows that people tend to focus primarily on
foreseeable and imaginable costs and benefits when
making decisions, and ignore or grossly underweight
factors that are not relevant until much later [42, 43].
For example, although people may be able to weigh,
with varying degrees of accuracy, the costs and
benefits of adopting a health-related behavior, it is
much more difficult to accurately consider the
difficulty of changing that behavior at some
unspecified time in the future [43]. Our results
suggest that it may be the same with decisions about
the disclosure of personal information: the immediate
and short-term costs and benefits are evaluated
separately, yet related to, the possibility of wanting to
delete that information at some later time. If so, just
as research on the use of IT has had to expand
beyond the study of initial adoption and explicitly
address issues of discontinuance [44, 45], privacy
research must explicitly address not only decisions
about whether to disclose personal information, but
also explicitly investigate what prompts people to
desire to discontinue such disclosure.
As with any research, it is important to
acknowledge this study’s limitations. Some may
criticize a reliance on students and AMT respondents
in our pilot studies. As this work progresses forward,
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some redress of this will be undertaken with a more
robust and diverse sampling. However, recent
research has indicated that AMT participants
classified as “master workers” (which was the case in
this study) are at least as valid as those collected from
professional data collection services [46, 47].
Additionally, we have not yet tested the
nomological relationship between RTBF, privacy
concerns, and other factors. We have also not
resolved the question of how the RTBF relates to the
other six dimensions of privacy concerns: all four
models we tested fit the data well. Furthermore, we
have not yet examined how attitudes about the RTBF
differ across types of information. Consumers have
different levels of privacy concerns for different
types of information [48, 49]. Consequently, it is not
surprising that there is some evidence that European
consumers’ requests to apply the EU’s recently
established RTBF to have Google delist search
engine results focus on some types of information
more than others [50]. However, there are many other
relevant forms of information that consumers may
want deleted besides that which Google indexes (e.g.,
private social media posts restricted to friends,
Internet of things data, mobile device sensory data,
etc.). Therefore, additional research is needed to
more fully understand how consumers’ feelings about
the RTBF vary across types of information besides
that which shows up in search engines. Such research
may help resolve the ongoing heated debates about
whether the RTBF conflicts with first amendment
rights (c.f. [14] versus [51]) because they want to
censor news stories about themselves or whether they
are more interested in being able to control retention
and storage of personal information they post on
social media and that businesses collect about their
online behaviors. We plan to address all these issues
in subsequent work.
In conclusion, this study developed and validated
a set of questions that can be used to assess a
person’s feelings about the RTBF. Those feelings are
related to, but distinct from, previously validated
dimensions of privacy concerns.
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